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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Jesse Kithcart appeals from a judgment in a criminal 
case. Kithcart pled guilty to one count of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 922(g)(1), 
but he reserved his right to appeal the district court's 
decision on his motion to suppress the firearm in question. 
This appeal raises the question whether the officers had 
probable cause to arrest and search Kithcart. Because we 
conclude that they did not have probable cause, we reverse 
the district court's denial of the suppression motion on the 
grounds given, and we remand for further proceedings in 




On July 25, 1995, Bensalem Township Police Officer 
Teresa Nelson was assigned to a radio patrol car on the 
evening shift. Over the course of an hour, Officer Nelson 
received three radio transmissions, each reporting an 
armed robbery. The first two robberies occurred at motels 
in Bensalem Township, and the last transmission 
concerned a robbery in neighboring Bristol Township. The 
final report -- which was received at approximately 10:43 
p.m. -- did not specify either the time or location of the 
Bristol robbery. Bristol is north of, and adjacent to, 
Bensalem Township. 
 
The alleged perpetrators of these robberies were 
described as "two black males in a black sports car." It was 
also reported that one of the perpetrators might have been 
wearing white clothes, and the vehicle was described as a 
"possible Z-28, possible Camaro."1  
 
At 10:53 p.m. -- approximately ten minutes after 
receiving the final radio transmission regarding the Bristol 
robbery -- Officer Nelson spotted a black Nissan 300ZX, 
which she described as a sports car, traveling south on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Z-28 is a type of Camaro. 
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Route 13, approximately a mile or less from the boundary 
of Bristol Township. The vehicle was driven by an African- 
American male who appeared to be the only person in the 
car. Officer Nelson testified that since the time when she 
received the first radio transmission more than an hour 
earlier, this was the first occasion when she spotted either 
a black vehicle or a black male driving a car. Officer Nelson 
also testified that immediately after she pulled up behind 
the vehicle, which had stopped at a red light, the driver 
drove the Nissan through the red light. Officer Nelson then 
flashed her dome lights, and the Nissan pulled over to the 
side of the road. At this point, Officer Nelson saw two sets 
of arms raised toward the roof of the car, and she realized 
that there were two people in the car. 
 
Officer Nelson then called for backup and waited in her 
patrol car until Officers Christine Kellaher and Bill Williams 
arrived at the scene. Officer Williams found a gun in 
Kithcart's white nylon waist pouch, and Officer Kellaher 
found a gun under the driver's seat. 
 
In moving to suppress the evidence seized by the police, 
Kithcart contended among other things, that the police 
lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop 
pursuant to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and related cases. See App. 95a. 
Consistent with this argument, Kithcart argued that Officer 
Williams had discovered his gun during a "pat down" or 
"frisk" but that the standard for conducting a "frisk" under 
Terry had not been met. App. 97a. The government argued 
that the police were justified in stopping the car because 
the driver ran a red light. In addition, the government's 
brief argued as follows: 
 
       [G]iven that Officers Nelson and Williams were 
       confronted with two black males in a black sports car 
       shortly after and in the vicinity of the reported 
       robberies, and that the males had attempted to flee 
       upon seeing Officer Nelson's car pull behind theirs, the 
       totality of the circumstances established reasonable 
       suspicion to support the pat-down of the defendant 
       and his waist-pack. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
       752, 763 (1969) (lawful arrest creates a situation which 
       justifies a contemporaneous search of arrestee and 
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       immediate area, including area from within which 
       arrestee might gain possession of a weapon); Terry v. 
       Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 1968 (limited pat-down of a suspect's 
       exterior clothing and protective sweep of area within 




At the hearing on the motion, counsel for Kithcart, 
counsel for the government, and the court all referred to 
the government's latter argument as concerning the 
question of "probable cause" (see e.g., App. 27a, 28a, 54a, 
58a), and at the conclusion of the hearing,2 the district 
court orally ruled that the police had "probable cause . . . 
for the stop." App. 60a. The court relied on "the direction, 
the timing, the location of the vehicle, plus the fact it [was] 
a black sports car." App. 60a. The court noted the 
discrepancy between the radioed description of the 
perpetrators as two black males and Officer Nelson's initial 
belief that there was only one black male in the car, but the 
court held that the fact that Officer Nelson had not seen 
any other black men driving cars since she received the 
initial radio transmission heightened the probability that 
the driver of the vehicle had been involved in the robberies. 
Because the court concluded that the officers had probable 
cause, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether 
the alleged running of the red light provided an 
independent basis for Officer Nelson's stop and the 
subsequent actions of the officers. 
 
Following this ruling, Kithcart pled guilty, subject to the 
condition that he be allowed to challenge on appeal the 
district court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Officer Nelson testified at the hearing. Officers Kellaher and Williams 
did not testify. Officer Nelson's account of the traffic violation was 
disputed by the defense. Co-defendant Carl Green-- the driver of the car 
and a cooperating witness against Kithcart -- told the government that 
he had not driven through a red light prior to the stop by Officer Nelson. 
The district court did not resolve this issue, relying instead on its 
finding 
that there was probable cause to arrest and search based on the radio 
transmissions. 
 




We turn first to the ground on which we understand the 
district court to have denied Kithcart's suppression motion, 
viz., that the officers had "probable cause" to arrest 
Kithcart and to search him incident to the arrest. When a 
warrantless search is made pursuant to an arrest, "[t]he 
constitutional validity of the search . . . must depend upon 
the constitutional validity of the . . . arrest." Beck v. Ohio, 
379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 
 
       Whether that [warrantless] arrest was constitutionally 
       valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment 
       the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to 
       make it -- whether at that moment the facts and 
       circumstances within their knowledge and of which 
       they had reasonably trustworthy information were 
       sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that 
       the [suspect] had committed or was committing an 
       offense. 
 
Id. See also Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 
(3d Cir. 1994) (test for probable cause is objective test: did 
the police officer have a reasonable basis for believing that 
the suspect had committed or was committing a crime). 
Our review of a district court's determination that there was 
probable cause to effect a warrantless search is de novo. 
Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1659 (1996). 
 
Based on the standard set by the Supreme Court in 
Beck, the district court erred in concluding that there was 
probable cause to arrest and search Kithcart prior to the 
discovery of the guns. The mere fact that Kithcart is black 
and the perpetrators had been described as two black 
males is plainly insufficient. As we have previously noted, 
a description of " `two negro males' and two `black males' 
. . . without more . . . would not have been sufficient to 
provide probable cause to arrest [the suspect]." Edwards v. 
City of Philadelphia, 860 F.2d 568, 571 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Moreover, the match between the description of the 
perpetrators' car (a black sports car, "possible Z-28, 
possible Camaro)" and the vehicle in which Kithcart was 
spotted (a black Nissan 300ZX) was far from precise. 
Although the Camaro Z-28 and the Nissan 300ZX could be 
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considered "sports cars," there was no evidence offered at 
the suppression hearing that the shapes of the two cars 
were sufficiently similar so as to warrant an inference that 
a 300ZX could be mistaken for a Z-28. 
 
Nor is probable cause established by either the location 
or time of the stop. There was no evidence presented as to 
where in Bristol Township the final robbery occurred; nor 
was there evidence presented that the Bristol robbery 
occurred shortly before Officer Nelson stopped the car 
carrying Kithcart. Although the radio transmission 
regarding the Bristol robbery came approximately 10 
minutes before the vehicle was stopped, Officer Nelson 
testified that she did not recall that the radio transmission 
revealed when the Bristol robbery occurred, other than that 
it occurred that same evening. Compare Edwards, 860 F.2d 
at 571 n.2 (although the description "two negro males" was 
insufficient by itself to provide probable cause to arrest 
suspect, other evidence closely linking suspect to scene of 
reported crime was sufficient). In sum, we think that it is 
clear that the facts and circumstances within Officer 
Nelson's knowledge at the time she stopped the Nissan were 
insufficient to allow a prudent person to believe that the car 
and its occupants had committed or were committing an 
offense. In other words, armed with information that two 
black males driving a black sports car were believed to have 
committed three robberies in the area some relatively short 
time earlier, Officer Nelson could not justifiably arrest any 
African-American man who happened to drive by in any 




The finding of no probable cause, however, does not end 
the inquiry. In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court 
held that law enforcement officers may stop and 
temporarily detain persons short of arrest without violating 
the Fourth Amendment. A Terry stop is justified when an 
officer has a reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity 
may be afoot." Id. at 30. The officer's suspicion must be 
based on articulable facts and not merely the officer's 
subjective good faith. Id. at 21. An officer may also conduct 
a "reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the 
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police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is 
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual . . .." Id. 
at 27. The test is "whether a reasonably prudent man in 
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his 
safety or that of others was in danger." Id. As noted, this 
question was briefed by the parties in the district court, but 
the district court did not base its decision on this ground. 
 
On remand, the district court should examine whether 
Officer Nelson had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to 
warrant an investigative stop. The court should consider 
both of the government's asserted grounds for the stop: (1) 
the alleged traffic infraction and (2) the information 
regarding the armed robbery suspects discussed in Section 
II, infra. The district court should also consider whether the 
events leading to the discovery of the weapon in Kithcart's 
pouch can be justified as a Terry "pat-down" We offer no 




For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district 
court erred in finding that Officer Nelson had probable 
cause to arrest and search Kithcart. We therefore reverse 
the denial of the suppression motion and remand for 
further proceedings to consider whether the officers had 
reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop and weapons 
search of Kithcart's person. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in part. 
 
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
prosecution did not establish that Officer Nelson had 
probable cause to arrest the defendant. However, the same 
testimony that requires us to reverse the district court's 
determination that the government had probable cause also 
establishes that Officer Nelson did not have reasonable 
suspicion to stop and detain the occupants of the car. 
Therefore, I disagree with the majority's decision to remand 
this matter so that the district court can determine if the 
stop was authorized under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
It clearly was not, and I would so rule as a matter of law. 
Thus, I dissent from that portion of the opinion that allows 




Terry v. Ohio created a very limited exception to the 
general warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. See 392 U.S. at 21. 
Although Terry allows an investigative stop, it still requires 
reasonable suspicion before the government can justify 
even this limited intrusion. "It is well established that an 
investigatory stop short of an arrest is valid based upon a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." United 
States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1994) 
"Reasonable suspicion must be based upon `specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts reasonably warrant that 
intrusion.' " Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 
 
This record establishes only that three armed robberies 
had occurred -- two in Bensalem Township and one in 
Bristol -- sometime during the evening of July 25, 1995, 
and that two Black males in a black sports car that was 
probably a Camero Z28 were involved. Officer Nelson did 
not know which direction nor road the car was last reported 
traveling. Although the car in which the defendant was 
riding was a black sports car, it was not a Camero Z28. 
Rather, the defendant was traveling in a Nissan Model 
300ZX. As the majority correctly notes, the record contains 
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no evidence that these two cars are so similar that they can 
easily be confused with each other or that Officer Nelson 
believed the Nissan to be a Camero. Officer Nelson's focus 
was not on a particular model sports car. Instead, it was on 
the color of the sports car and the race of its occupants. 
 
The car that Officer Nelson stopped was not only a 
different make and model than the one most likely involved 
with the armed robberies, but the number of occupants it 
contained appeared to be inconsistent with the radio 
broadcast as well. The majority points out that it was only 
after Officer Nelson initiated the stop and saw a second pair 
of hands go into the air that she realized that the car did 
in fact contain two males.1 At the suppression hearing, 
Officer Nelson was asked, "from the time you pulled directly 
behind the vehicle and the time you pulled the vehicle over, 
you thought initially that there was one black male in that 
vehicle?" She answered: "Correct." App. 47a. Therefore, 
disregarding the allegation of a traffic violation, Officer 
Nelson stopped this car solely because it was a black sports 
car driven by an African American male near Bristol 
Township shortly after she learned that two African 
American males had committed a series of armed robberies 
in that area. Based on this record, the majority correctly 
concludes that "Officer Nelson could not justifiably arrest 
any African American man who happened to drive by in any 
type of black sports car." Majority Op. at 6. However, the 
majority then allows the government an opportunity to 
establish that Officer Nelson's stop was appropriate under 
Terry v. Ohio, rather than following the obvious extension of 
its own logic. Just as this record fails to establish that 
Officer Nelson had probable cause to arrest any Black male 
who happened to drive by in a black sports car, it also fails 
to establish reasonable suspicion to justify stopping any 
and all such cars that happened to contain a Black male. 
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 
The majority states "on remand the district court should 
examine whether Officer Nelson had a reasonable suspicion 
sufficient to warrant an investigative stop." Majority Op. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I do not mean to suggest that Officer Nelson would have been justified 
in stopping this Nissan even if she had seen the passenger. 
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7. However, it is clear that she did not. "In determining 
whether a stop is justified, the court must view the 
circumstances surrounding the stop in their entirety, giving 
due weight to the experience of the officers." Rickus, 737 
F2d at 365. The district court explained the discrepancy 
between the radio broadcast of two Black males and Officer 
Nelson's observation of a different model black sports car 
containing only one Black male as follows: 
 
       Now, the issue of one black male versus two black 
       males. She testified that she had not seen cars driven 
       by other black males for the time she had been looking, 
       and she sees a black sports car driven by one black 
       male. I do believe its still supported by probable cause 
       that there is another black male in the car, or that 
       perhaps they had split up or whatever. 
 
       But even so, I think the probable cause is heightened 
       by the fact that she had not seen a lot of cars driven 
       by black males in this area. . . . 
 
App. at 60a. 
 
However, there is nothing on this record to suggest that 
the perpetrators "had split up" following the robbery, or 
that someone other than the driver was in the car when 
Officer Nelson stopped it. Unsupported conjecture of this 
type would allow a stop of a car containing any number of 
Black males as one could always speculate that the car 
stopped and perpetrators got in or out of the car. This 
speculation renders the radio information regarding the 
number of suspects irrelevant and allows police officers to 
stop any Black person riding in any car that is"similar" to 
one involved in a crime even where, as here, that car does 
not match the likely description that has been broadcast on 
police radio. Conclusions based upon possibilities, no 
matter how remote or speculative, are inconsistent with the 
need to justify an investigative stop with reasonable 
suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts. 
Accordingly, any attempt to justify the instant stop under 
Terry would elevate speculation and conjecture to the level 
of articulable facts. 
 
       [T]he types of articulable facts that can provide 
       reasonable suspicion cannot include `circumstances 
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       [which] describe a very large category of presumably 
       innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually 
       random seizures' were the circumstances accepted as 
       reasons for the investigation. 
 
Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 492 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980)). That is what 
happened here. Absent a traffic violation, Officer Nelson's 
stop is little more than a random stop of an African 




Although I agree that it would normally be important to 
determine if the car that was stopped went through a red 
light, I question the propriety of allowing that inquiry in 
this case. At the beginning of the suppression hearing, an 
issue arose as to Officer Nelson's credibility. The prosecutor 
stated that he was going to call Officer Nelson, and that she 
was going to testify that the driver of the car in which 
defendant was riding disregarded a red light when she 
pulled up behind the car. The prosecutor also informed the 
district court that Carl Green, the driver of that car, had 
already entered a guilty plea in front of a different judge. As 
part of his plea agreement, Green had agreed to "cooperate, 
and provide truthful testimony" in the government's 
prosecution of Kithcart. App. at 13a. Although Green's 
testimony apparently implicated Green in the armed 
robberies, the government stipulated that if he were called 
to testify at Kithcart's suppression hearing, Green would 
testify that he did not go through the red light when Officer 
Nelson pulled up behind his car. 
 
       Essentially the bottom line is, that Carl Green, if called 
       to testify at this hearing, would say that it was his 
       recollection that he did not go through a red light 
       immediately prior to being stopped by Officer Nelson. 
 
       And I discussed this matter with [defense counsel] and 
       he felt that if the government would enter into a 
       stipulation that it would be Mr. Green's testimony, that 
       there would be no need to have Mr. Green as a witness 
       in the hearing and that Police Officer Nelson's 
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       testimony would be the only evidence the government 
       would put forward. 
 
App. at 22a. 
 
However, the district court was justifiably concerned 
about making a credibility determination that required it to 
judge the live testimony of Officer Nelson against 
contradicting testimony that was to be admitted by way of 
stipulation. The court told defense counsel: 
 
       I guess the problem I have is that you want me to 
       assess credibility, and you want me to do it in a 
       vacuum. In other words, assess this police officer's 
       credibility compared to nothing, compared to the fact 
       that Mr. Green wouldn't be testifying, but that he 
       would say. And yet for the purpose of credibility, that 
       makes it very difficult, are you certain this is the way 
       you want me to proceed? 
 
App. at 25a. 
 
The government responded that its position was that 
Officer Nelson had reasonable suspicion when she pulled 
up behind Green's car, but that the government's argument 
was two prong. The government argued that the car was 
stopped for a traffic violation but, regardless of the alleged 
violation, Officer Nelson still had reasonable suspicion to 
stop the car based upon the radio transmissions she 
received regarding armed robberies in a neighboring 
township. App. at 26a. The prosecutor stated "even if your 
Honor were to discount . . . Officer Nelson's testimony 
[about the traffic violation] in its entirety, there was still 
reasonable suspicion" to stop the car. App. at 26a. No 
doubt out of a desire to adjudicate this case fairly and 
expeditiously, the district court agreed to hear Green's 
testimony outside the presence of the jury during the 
course of his trial testimony and to reserve any issue of 
credibility until that point. This would have allowed the 
trial to proceed while still affording both sides a fair 
opportunity to litigate the credibility issues that related to 
the suppression motion. The court then reemphasized:"I 
would be very reluctant to make a decision without hearing 
from [Green]." The trial judge told the prosecutor, "I believe 
the ball is in your court." App. at 29a. Almost immediately 
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thereafter, the government called Officer Nelson to testify 
about the circumstances leading up to the arrest of the 
defendant. However, at the conclusion of Officer Nelson's 
testimony the district court upheld the arrest based upon 
its belief that Officer Nelson's testimony established 
probable cause regardless of any traffic violation, and the 
defendant entered his conditional guilty plea immediately 
thereafter. Accordingly, the matter never proceeded to trial, 
and the district court never had an opportunity to hear 
Green's testimony and make a finding of fact about the 
alleged traffic violation. 
 
Officer Nelson would clearly have been justified in 
stopping Green's car to enforce the traffic laws if Green 
drove through a red light. See United States v. Moorefield, 
111 F.3d 10, 12 (3d. Cir. 1997) ("It is well-established that 
a traffic stop is lawful under the Fourth Amendment where 
a police officer observes a violation of the sate traffic 
regulations."). The police would also have been justified in 
ordering Green and Kithcart out of the car if that is what 
happened. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 
(1977) (concluding that ordering a driver out of the car after 
a traffic violation is a justifiable, de minimis intrusion). 
However, the record does not allow a court to determine 
what happened after the car was stopped. The prosecutor 
apparently thought that the gun that was seized from 
Kithcart would automatically be admitted if he established 
the legality of the initial stop. However, the traffic violation 
would not necessarily allow the prosecution to admit the 
gun into evidence merely because it justified the traffic 
stop. This record is devoid of evidence to support a 
conclusion that any search of Kithcart's person after the 
stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
The prosecution informed the district court that the only 
evidence it planned to present during the suppression 
hearing was Officer Nelson's testimony. The following 
exchange occurred during that testimony: 
 
       Q. Did any officer recover a gun from the defendant, 
       Jesse Kithcart? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. Who was that? 
 
                                13 
  
       A. That was Officer Bill Williams. 
 
* * * 
 
       Q. I was given [by Officer Williams] a 32 revolver and 
       I was given a white nylon pouch. 
 
       Q. Have you spoken to Officer Williams about where 
       they recovered the gun from Mr. Kithcart? 
 
       A. Yes. 
 
       Q. What did Officer Williams say? 
 
       A. Officer Williams stated to me that the gun was 
       recovered from the nylon pouch. 
 
       Q. And where was the nylon pouch? 
 
       A. It was on Mr. Kithcart's waist. 
 
App. at 40a-41a. The prosecution never planned to call 
Officer Williams, or any other witness, (other than Carl 
Green) and there is nothing to suggest that additional 
testimony was unavailable. Officer Nelson neither searched 
the car nor the seized weapon in question. She may have 
seen other officers conduct the search and/or seize the 
gun, but that was not her testimony. There is nothing on 
this record to inform the suppression court whether 
Kithcart's gun was discovered during a pat down search or 
whether it was in plain view - though inside the pouch. The 
fact finder must guess about how the gun was seized and 
any basis for the reasonable suspicion that may have been 
necessary to justify the seizure.2 
 
I appreciate that any police officer approaching this car 
would be apprehensive. That is true whether or not the 
driver had gone through a red light. Indeed, the normal 
experience of a police officer would dictate caution in 
approaching any stopped car whether or not the officer 
believed the car to contain armed suspects. "The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly recognized that traffic stops are 
dangerous encounters that result in assaults and murders 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There were several police officers on the scene, and it is unclear 
whether Officer Williams seized the gun from Kithcart, or if he merely 
received it from another officer and gave it to Officer Nelson. 
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of police officers." Moorefield. 111 F.3d at 13. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). However, although 
the exigencies and dangers that are endemic to any such 
confrontation are part of the analysis of whether the 
resulting intrusion is "reasonable" under the Fourth 
Amendment, they do not remove all of the protection 
afforded under it. Accordingly, a police officer can conduct 
a pat down search of the occupants of a stopped car"where 
the officer is `able to point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.' " Id. (quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). The reasonable inferences that arise 
from the circumstances of a traffic stop are such that it 
does not require a "leap of faith" to conclude that the 
instant seizure was justified if there was a traffic violation. 
However, the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment 
are too important to allow Officer Nelson's testimony to 
bridge the void in this record. The prosecutor here made no 
effort to have an appropriate witness articulate the 
circumstances surrounding the seizure of the gun. 
Accordingly, I am reluctant to assume that the government 
should now be allowed to produce a witness on remand 
that it should have, and could have, called during the 
initial suppression hearing. 
 
I would leave it to the trial court's discretion to decide 
whether the prosecutor should be allowed to produce the 
testimony that I think is needed to bridge the interstices in 
this transcript. That court will be in the best position to 
determine whether or not the government should be 
allowed a second the bite of the Terry apple by producing 
testimony beyond that which is necessary to rule upon the 
issue of the alleged traffic violation. If there was no traffic 
violation, Officer Nelson was not justified in stopping the 
car in which Kithcart was riding. If the suppression court 
concludes that there was a traffic violation, then it should 
determine the propriety of allowing testimony regarding the 
circumstances of the seizure after considering any 
explanation as to why that testimony was not produced 
initially. 
 
I do not think it is asking too much to expect attorneys 
to attempt to meet their burdens of proof when issues are 
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first litigated. A court should not have to connect the dots 
of inferences scattered as far apart as the ones on this 
record to construct a picture of what occurred during the 
stop. Accordingly, although I join the majority opinion 
insofar as it reverses the order of the district court, I must, 
however, respectfully dissent from the remainder of my 
colleagues' opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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